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UNTOLD TRUTHS: THE EXCLUSION OF
ENFORCED STERILIZATIONS FROM THE
PERUVIAN TRUTH COMMISSION'S
FINAL REPORT
JOCELYN

E.

GETGEN*

ASTIAc'r: This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced steriliza-

tion cases from the Peruvian Truth Commission's investigation and Final Report effectively erases State responsibility and decreases the likelihood for justice and reparations for women victims-survivors of Statesponsored violence in Peru. In a context of deep cultural and economic
divides and violent conflict, this Article recounts how the State's Family
Planning Program violated Peruvian women's reproductive rights by
sterilizing low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women without
informed consent. This Article argues that these systematic reproductive
injustices constitute an act of genocide, proposes an independent inquiry, and advocates for a more inclusive investigation and final report
for future truth commissions whose goals include truth, accountability,
and justice for all victims-survivors of state-sponsored violence. Leaders
responsible for the enforced sterilization of more than 200,000 Peruvian
women, including former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori, must be
held accountable for past violations in order to fully realize future reconciliation and justice in Peru.

* J.D., Cornell Law School; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health; B.A., Cornell University. Women and Justice Fellow, Cornell Law School. The author would like to thank Lisa Laplante for her essential support and contributions to research conducted in Peru. In addition, the author would like to recognize Professor Billie
Jean Isbell, Dr. Carlos Ivfin Degregori Caso, Dr. Salom6n Lerner Febres and Eduardo Gonz~ilez Cueva for their meaningful contributions toward an understanding of the context of
the internal conflict in Peru. Also, the author thanks her family and friends for their undying love and support. Finally, the author would like to dedicate this Article to the women
of the world who have suffered and died as a result of government campaigns of enforced
sterilization. May their voices be heard and may we move toward a world where reproductive justice and freedom are rights enjoyed by all.
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"[E]very society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past
events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes
came to be committed.. .."
INTRODUCTION

Does time heal all wounds? Can a transitioning democratic society
move forward without fully facing the human rights violations that
plague its past? Or can only truth and justice reconcile large-scale
abuses? Difficult lessons from the recent past have taught societies and
nations that legitimate democracies require political and personal accountability reinforced by the rule of law.2 International human rights
treaties thus impose upon states a duty to investigate, criminally prosecute, and punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity.3 Although
state actions taken in response to gross violations of human rights are
never truly adequate when communities, families, and individuals suffer irreparable harms, inaction is invariably worse. 4 A state's failure to
respond appropriately and justly to gross human rights abuses can give
victims the sense that their perpetrators emerged either victorious or
5
with clean hands.
The Peruvian government's response to twenty years of human
rights abuses from 1980 to 2000 included creating a truth commission
with a broad mandate to "promote national reconciliation, the rule of
justice and the strengthening of the constitutional democratic regime." 6 By forming the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR),7 the State initiated a process of achieving national reconciliation through an attempt to correct the historical record, provide
a collective memory and preserve the possibility of criminal account8
ability and justice.
I GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 328 (The New Press 2006) (1999) (quoting the IAC ANNUAL REPORT 193 (Sept. 26,

1986)).
2 SeeJOHN BORNEMAN, SETTLING ACCOUNTS: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN POSTSOCIALIST EUROPE 3 (1997).

3 See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 327-28.
4 See MARTHA MINow, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR

15-16 (2002).
5 See id. at 16.
6 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 1 (June 2, 2001) (Peru).
7 Comisi6n de la Verdad y Reconciliaci6n.
8 See Amnesty Int'l, Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission-A First Step Towards a
Country Without Injustice, AI Index AMR 46/003/2004, 1-2 (Aug. 2004); PRISCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 24-31
(2002) (discussing the basic objectives of a truth commission: "to discover, clarify, and for-
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In many respects, the CVR is a model for future truth commissions
that strive to end impunity, attend to the needs of victims, initiate state
investigations and systemic reforms, gain a critical perspective to confront internal conflict, and condemn individuals and institutions for
abuses.9 Although this Commission serves as an ambitious and inclusive
mechanism for accountability and truth-telling, it fails to provide a record and voice to more than 200,000 marginalized, indigenous
Quechua-speaking women in Peru who were victims of a Statesponsored enforced sterilization campaign.10 The exclusion of largescale reproductive rights abuses committed against the poorest and
most marginalized sectors of Peruvian society demonstrates a weakness
of the C4, impedes justice for these individuals, and provides further
lessons for truth commissions of the future." With large-scale human
rights abuses occurring in conflicts and transitioning regimes around
the world-the internal and international conflicts in Iraq, for example' 2 -the transitional justice community must responsibly ensure that
the collective memory includes all victims and that their voices are not

mally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability;, to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to
promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past"); MiNow, supra note 4, at 24-27.
See generally RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGrrIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001) (describing the truth-telling and reconciliation functions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
9 See CoMIsI6N DE ENTREGA DE LA CoMIsI6N DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILL4CI6N, HATUN
WILLAKUY: VERSI6N ABREVIADA DEL INFORME FINAL DE LA CoMIsI6N DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACI6N 433-65 (2004); TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, GENERAL

CONCLUSIONS passim (2003) available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifmal/conclusiones.php [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
10 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 9. These
women predominantly lived in rural areas in the Andes and Peruvian Amazon. Amnesty
Int'l, supra note 8, at 20.
11See discussion infra Part I1.
12 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, PostconfliaJusticein Iraq, 33 HuM. RTs. 15 passim (2006)
(highlighting the violent and widespread conflict in Iraq and advocating for a post-conflict
justice strategy that includes prosecution of offenders, a victim compensation scheme, the
creation of a historic commission, and revamping the Iraqi legal system); Jennifer Moore,
Collective Security with a Human Face: An InternationalLegal Frameworkfor oordinatedAction to
Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43 passim (2004) (finding a legal
obligation to promote human security in certain international human rights documents and

arguing that security will not be established until political and civil liberties and secure and
basic economic and social needs are met); NGO Coordination Comm. in Iraq & Oxfarn Int'l,
Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq, Briefing Paper 105, July 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/18 07 07 oxfamiraq.pdf (calling for an
increase in humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and estimating that eight million
Iraqis are in need of emergency aid).
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silenced in the future processes of truth and reconciliation. 13 Furthermore, with Peru's current step toward accountability and transitional
justice-the trial of former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori-advocates and other members of civil society must push for reproductive
justice for the victims-survivors of enforced sterilization in Peru in or14
der to move toward truth, justice, and reconciliation for all.
This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced sterilizations
cases in the CVR's investigation and Final Report effectively erases State
responsibility and greatly decreases the likelihood that Peru will seek
justice for the victims of these violations of reproductive rights. Part I
provides an overview of the sharp cultural and economic divides in Peruvian society, examines the history of violent conflict in Peru from
1980 to 2000, and recounts how healthcare providers violated Peruvian
women's reproductive rights when they sterilized low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women either against their will or without informed consent through the State's Family Planning Program. Part II
discusses the creation and implementation of the CVR through its executive mandate. Part II challenges the reasons for excluding these
cases in the Commission's investigation and Final Report and also examines the effects of these omissions. Part IV proposes an independent
inquiry with regard to these abuses and advocates for a more inclusive
investigation and final report for future truth commissions whose goals
include truth, accountability, and justice.

Is Cf David M. Crane, White Man's Justice: Applying InternationalJustice After Regional
Third World Conflicts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2006) (advocating for victims' central role in the truth, reconciliation, and justice process). See generally KADER ASMAL ET AL.,
RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE

(1997) (discussing the need for reconciliation through collective memory and corrective

action);

JAMES

L.

GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED

NATION? (2004) (discussing the truth and reconciliation process of transitional justice in
South Africa); RuTI G. TITEL, TIRANSrrIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing various concepts
of transitional justice and the rule of law in times of political change); Ruti Teitel, The Law
andPolitics of Contemporary TransitionalJustice,38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 837 (2005) (reviewing
contemporary developments in transitional justice).
14 See supranotes 8, 12; Fujimori on Trial: Accountability in Action, http://fujimorion
trial.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (providing news and analysis regarding the Fujimori

trial).
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I.

THE PATHS TO VIOLENT CONFLICT

A. Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Society

Tawantinsuyu's15 destruction and Peru's birth began when the
Spanish Conquistadors invaded Incan lands, captured the last Incan
ruler, Atahualpa, and massacred thousands of Incan warriors in the
Andean city of Cajamarca in 1532.16 During the first one hundred years
of colonial rule and oppression in Peru, the indigenous population in
the Andes region plummeted from nine million to six hundredthousand people. 17 From this swift defeat and near destruction of the
highland indigenous peoples of Peru emerged the myth of the "vanquished race": that the Incas and their descendants lacked decisionmaking ability and individual initiative and, thus, "could or should be
I8
exterminated, 'civilized,' instructed, or saved."
Spanish colonial rule guaranteed impoverishment and death for
many indigenous Peruvians and perpetuated the fragmented and divided structures that continue to exist in Peruvian society today. 19 First,
a geographical divide exists between the coastal region-predominately
urban, white and Spanish-speaking-and the highlands-mostly rural,
indigenous and Quechua-speaking. 20 In addition, the coastal region
boasts an overwhelming majority of the nation's wealth and political
power, and, as a result, political and economic programs in past regimes have largely ignored or neglected the needs of the indigenous
peoples in the highlands and rainforest regions. 21 Moreover, there are
racial and ethnic gaps that divide Peruvian society among groups of
Spanish descent (criollos), mixed Spanish and indigenous descent (mestizos), indigenous of Andean origin who have moved to the urban cen-

15 Tawantinsuyu is the name of the pre-colonial Incan Empire. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA, SCURLOCK-TIRAH IX, 845 (15th ed. 1983).
16 See THE PERU READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 81, 102-06 (Orin Starn et al.

eds., 1995).
17 Id. at 82.
Is Id. at 81-82.
19 See id. at 112;

AMERICAS WATCH, PERU UNDER FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE RE-

TURN TO DEMOCRACY 1 (1992).
20 AMERICAS WATCH, supra

note 19, at 1; Carlos Ivfn Degregori, Comm'r, Peruvian
Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n, Questions of Violence and Racism in a Diverse Society:
The Findings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Address at Cornell
Law School (Nov. 28, 2005) (transcript available with the author).
21 AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1.
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ters of the country (cholos) and indigenous who continue to live a more
traditional way of life in the highlands (indigenas).22
Although today indigenous groups are beginning to organize politically and socially to demand individual and collective rights from the
State, 23 invidious discrimination and economic, cultural and social divides still exist at all levels of Peruvian society.24 In Peru, indigenous
peoples continue to be seen as second-class citizens, a racist view established through these divides, their situations of extreme poverty, and
25
the inadequate access to basic health care and education.
B. Twenty Years of Violent Internal Conflict in Peru
1. Setting the Stage for State-Sponsored Violence
Before the Peruvian government committed more than 200,000
enforced sterilizations against indigenous Quechua-speaking women
through its Family Planning Program during the 1990s, the internal
conflict between insurgent groups and the State created an environment of fear in which few openly questioned government policies. 2 6 At
first, violence in Peru erupted in 1980 when the Maoist armed government opposition group, the Shining Path, 27 initiated a political,
"popular" war against the State. 28 At that time, Peru had begun its tran-

22 See MARIA ELENA GARCiA, MAKING INDIGENOUS CITIZENS: IDENTITY, DEVELOPMENT,

AND MULTICULTURAL ACTIVISM IN PERU 27-29 (2005); Degregori, supra note 20.
23 See generally GARCiA, supra note 22 (discussing the issues surrounding indigenous
mobilization and citizenship in Peru).

24 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1-3; ENRIQUE MAYER, THE ARTICULATED
PEASANT: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIES IN THE ANDES 322 (2002); Degregori, supra note 20.
25 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1-3; MAYER, supra note 24, at 322-23;
Degregori, supra note 20.
26 See Eduardo Gonzilez Cueva, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Challenge of Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 70, 71-72 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza &Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006);
Degregori, supra note 20.
27Sendero Luminoso.
28 See Steve J. Stern, Introduction to Part III, in SHINING AND OTHER PATHS: WAR AND
SOCIETY IN PERU, 1980-1995, at 262-63 (Steve J. Stern ed., 1998); Degregori, supra note
20 (arguing that the CVR's final report highlighted the political will of the Shining Path
rather than digging deeper into the "structural violence" and poverty of the State). Although the CVR's report acknowledged that these structural concepts formed the background of the conflict, the concepts alone were not seen as enough to explain the extent
of the violence suffered. See Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, many social movements
of the time used the structural factors and widespread poverty to justify violence. See id.

The Shining Path actually argued that the State and the Peruvian people should not chastise the group for killing some reactionaries when many more multitudes of people were
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sition from a military regime to a civilian democracy; however, the Maoist faction did not participate in the left's incorporation into the political system.2 9 Instead of taking part in elections, Shining Path members
launched their communist-Maoist campaign by attacking the voter registration office in Chuschi, a small town in the central highlands of the
Ayacucho province, before dawn on Election Day in 1980.30 This political spark ignited a fire in a country with great disparity between rich
and poor, abject rural poverty, geographic exclusion in the Andes and
Amazon regions, and invidious discrimination and racism among eth31
nic and racial groups.
Next, the absence of a strong, unchallenged democratic transition,
combined with the presence of the revolutionary movement of the
Shining Path, caused the government to react with authoritarian rule
and military force, which then served to escalate the initial outbreaks of
violence. 32 Fernando Belainde's newly-elected government, in response to increasing social unrest, imposed states of emergency in departments throughout the country.33 In addition, the Armed Forces
used racial profiling and killed indiscriminately in areas of conflict with
the Peruvian government's knowledge and acquiescence. 3 4 In this context, the Shining Path gained support and momentum as some rural
peasant communities began to view the guerillas as the lesser of two
35
evils during the beginning of the armed struggle.
At first, certain peasant communities, such as those in the district
of Chuschi, also backed the Shining Path's efforts because the Shining Path's short-term goals aligned with their own: to drive out enemies in their towns who were gaining power, to establish better-quality
dying of hunger and malnutrition each day in Peru. See id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 71.
29 Anna-Britt Coe, From Anti-Natalist to Ultra-Conservative:Restricting Reproductive Choice
in Peru, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATrERS 56, 59 (2004); see GUsTAvo GORRITI, THE SHINING
PATH: A HISTORY OF THE MILLENARIAN WAR IN PERU 10-11 (Robin Kirk trans., The University of North Carolina Press 1999) (1990).
0 GORRITI, supra note 29, at 17; Billie Jean Isbell, ShiningPath and PeasantResponses in
Rural Ayacucho, in THE SHINING PATH OF PERU 77, 89-90 (David Scott Palmer ed., 2d ed.
1994).
31 See Degregori, supra note 20.
32 See id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 71-72 (noting that "[t]he combined action
of guerilla organizations, military units and local self-defense groups acting under the
command, or with the acquiescence of the state" actually caused the bulk of the deaths
that the CVR estimates occurred during the whole twenty-year period).
33See AMERICAS WATCH, supranote 19, at 6.
34 See Degregori, supra note 20.
35 See id. The slogan at the time was that the "Shining Path has one thousand eyes and
one thousand ears," while the State fights blindly. Id.
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schools, and to end government corruption.3 6 To some communities,
the revolution and "New Peru" meant that they would finally free
themselves from abusive bureaucrats and public officials and return
to the consensus framework with which traditional authorities governed in the past.37 In time, however, the Shining Path began to reor-

ganize peasant communities toward its ideology of a "future without
distinctions" in class or wealth and to assume authoritarian power
over them; as a result, the Andean people came to see the Shining
Path as nothing more than new oppressors. 38 "[I]nstead of becoming
the revolutionary vanguard in the communities, Shining Path [was]
perceived.., as a new form of haqa, the supernatural being that robs
body fat" in Andean mythology to pay off a debt. 39 The Shining Path
eventually lost what little peasant community support it had, and Andean citizens complied with military orders to organize civil defense
patrols in order to resist the efforts of Shining Path insurgents. 40
The Shining Path focused its class war in the countryside, the
"principal theater" of its actions, and complemented these efforts by
supporting armed strikes and mobilizations in the city.41 At first, the
Shining Path's motives remained a mystery to most urban Peruvians;
the cryptic messages- "Teng Hsiao-ping, son of a bitch" -wrapped
around dead dogs hanging from streetlamps in Lima seemed to them
to border on insanity.42 Soon, however, the dynamite attacks and kill-

ings intensified, and the uprising turned into a bloodbath that could
no longer be underestimated or ignored. 43
While the Armed Forces devised new strategies to defeat the Shining Path, the nation's social and political composition shifted under the
structural factors of a modernizing Peru. 44 First, a significant number
of Peruvians migrated from the rural areas to the cities, largely due to
the development of a market economy, increased transportation, and
as displaced persons of the armed conflict. 45 In addition, the relatively
36

1sbell, supra note 30, at 89-90.

37Id.

See id. at 90-92.
39 Id.
at 92.
40See id. at 79-80, 87.
38

GORROTI, supra note 29, at 68.
Id. at 76, 78.
43 See id. at 94-95, 104. The Shining Path developed the idea of the "quota": the willingness and expectation of its members to sacrifice their own lives when asked to do so by
the party. Id. at 104.
4See
Degregori, supra note 20.
45 See id. The number of desplazados (internally displaced persons) exceeded 600,000 at
the height of the armed conflict. Id.
41
42

HeinOnline -- 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 8 2009

2009]

Enforced Sterilization & the Peruvian Truth Commission

independent media and political and social organizations proved that
some level of democracy existed and fostered a rejection of the totalitarianism of the Shining Path movement.4 Finally, in 1992, the Peruvian police antiterrorism unit captured Abimael GuzmAn, the leader of
the Shining Path, who subsequently negotiated peace accords with the
Fujimori government and facilitated the fast demoralization and defeat
47
of Shining Path sympathizers.
Guzmin's capture followed Alberto Fujimori's election in 1990
and "self-coup" (autogolpe), which abruptly ended the rule of law in
1992. 48 Fujimori implemented a strategy to combat an economic crisis
and government subversion; he suppressed civil liberties and eroded
political institutions and notions of accountability.49 Then, when faced
with congressional opposition to his oppressive measures, he joined
forces with the military, suspended the Constitution, censored the me50
dia, dissolved the National Congress, and incapacitated the judiciary.
Even after the capture of the leading subversives and the awareness of a
crumbling insurgency, Fujimori's repressive authoritarian regime used
public fear and isolated incidences of violence to justify continued hu51
man rights abuses and political suppression throughout the 1990s.

46 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the media as investigators, "informal ombudsmen," and as a channel for opinion and information in Peruvian society);
Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, the Shining Path did not have an alternative to offer
the peasant populations after the destruction of the "old order." Degregori, supra note 20.
Most significantly, the movement ignored the needs of the peasant families in the Andes.
Degregori, supra note 20.
47 See Degregori, supra note 20; Gonzhlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; see also Stern, supranote 28, at 297.
48 See Gonzfilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; Stern, supra note 28, at 417; see also Interview with Eduardo Gonzhlez Cueva, Senior Associate, International Center for Transitional
Justice, former Director, Public Hearings and Victims and Witnesses Protection Unit, Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in N.Y, NY (Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Gonzilez Cueva Interview].
49 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, § II(D); see CATHERINE M. CONAGHAN, FUJIMORI'S
PERU: DECEPTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 29, 252-53 (2005).
50 See Kent Anderson, An Asian Pinochet?-NotLikely: The Unfulfilled InternationalLaw
Promise in Japan's Treatment of Former PeruvianPresidentAlberto Fujimori, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L.
177, 180-81 (2002); Gonzilez Cueva, supranote 26, at 72.
51 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 181; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 73; Gonzilez

Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
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2. State-Sponsored Enforced Sterilizations Under the Family Planning
Program: "Voluntary" Surgical Contraception (Anticoncepci6n
QuinirgicaVoluntaria-AQV)
Three months after President Fujimori took office in 1990, he announced a "birth control policy" as a way to bring equal access to contraception for the nation's poor.52 At that time, however, high inflation,
a lack of public funding, a focus on the internal conflict, and legal barriers in place against sterilizations forced the government to proceed
slowly despite its support for reforms in family planning programs in
Peru. 53 Fujimori's reelection gave his regime a strong mandate for implementing its plans, and in 1995, Congress approved a modification of
the National Population Law of 1985 to permit sterilization as a family
planning method. 54 At the same time, Fujimori garnered support from
feminists and advocates for the rights of women when, in 1995, he attended and spoke in Beijing at the Fourth International World Conference on Women. 55
In 1996, after finding an inverse relationship between population
growth and economic growth, Fujimori's administration quietly implemented a demographic policy for population control. 56 A stable
economy and widespread political support allowed Fujimori's regime to
openly confront the Catholic Church and its strong political positions
with regard to reproductive rights and choice. 57 Additionally, interna52 CARLOS E. ARAMBURU, POLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: A DANGEROUS CONNECTION

7 (2002), available at http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Seminars/Details/Seminars/

Carlos Cdceres et al., Sexual and Reproductive
Rights Policies in Peru: UnveilingFalse Paradoxes, in SEXPOLrrIcS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONT
Bangkok2002/03BangkokAramburu.pdf;

LINES 127, 137 (Richard Parker et al. eds., 2006). The traditional demographic argument
was coupled with the argument advocating for equal rights, which focused on individual
and family rights. ARAMBURU, supra, at 8.
53 See ARAMBURU, supra note 51, at 8.

54 See id. at 7-8.
55 See MARUJA BARRIG, THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY: FEMINISM AND THE STATE IN
PERU IN THE 1990S, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE ANDES AND THE
SOUTHERN CONE COMPARATIVE REGIONAL PROJECT 12-13 (1999).
56 See SUBCOMISION INVESTIGADORA DE PERSONAS E INSTITUCIONES INVOLUCRADAS EN
ACCIONES DE ANTICONCEPCI6N QUIRORGICA VOLUNTARIA [SUB-COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE
PEOPLE AND INSTS. INVOLVED IN VOLUNTARY SURGICAL CONTRACEPTION PROC.], INFORME
FINAL SOBRE LA APLICACION DE LA ANTICONCEPCI6N QUIR(JRGICA VOLUNTARIA 11 (2002)
[hereinafter AQVJ; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138; Coe, supra note 29, at 61.
57 See Coe, supranote 29, at 59 (asserting that when Fujimori first took power, he faced
many challenges, including violent internal conflict, a weak economy, and inflation. To
address these concerns, Fujimori needed the backing of the Catholic Church (which opposed modern contraceptive methods)); COMITt DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE PARA
LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER [LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COMMIT-
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tional and domestic pressures existed to address the widening gap
among socio-economic classes of Peruvians; thus, Fujimori's government promoted contraceptive services to "the most deprived sectors of
58
society" in a stated effort to alleviate poverty on a massive scale.
During this time, Fujimori continued to actively promote universal
access to contraception for women.5 9 His political discourse invoked
principles of social justice and human rights; his rhetoric even included
using the reproductive justice movement's language, stating that "poor
women deserved the same opportunity as wealthier women to regulate
their fertility, and [that] all women had the right to control their bodies
and use contraceptives if they wished." 60 With Fujimori's control over
Congressional action, the Ministry of Health soon drafted its first comprehensive reproductive health program. 61 Additional government
measures-including creating agencies and passing laws-also stressed
62
the importance of equality between men and women.
The government's aggressive Family Planning Program focused
on increasing the number of sterilizations performed on Peruvian
women and specifically targeted the low-income, indigenous women
at the margins of society.63 Moreover, government officials deter-

mined annual numeric goals and targets for the sterilization programs
and initiated an obligatory quota system for health care providers to
meet as program employees in order to remain employed, obtain
monetary compensation, or receive a promotion. 64 Later investigations revealed that health care provider practices included compensating women and subjecting them to aggression, intimidation, and
(CLADEM) & CTR. FOR REPROD. L. AND POL'Y
(CRLP), SILENCE AND COMPLICITY: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PERUVIAN PUBLIC

TEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS]

HEALTH FACILITIES 36 (1999) [hereinafter CLADEM & CRLP].
5

8 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20. See Coe, supra note 29, at 59. A Program Manager
at the Ministry of Health made the following statement in 1998:

The fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children-they are poor and are
producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government
cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people's fertility. Thus, demographic goals are a combination of the population's right to access family
planning and the government's anti-poverty strategy.
Coe, supra note 29, at 61-62.
59 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supranote 52, at 138.
60 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supranote 52, at 138-39.
61 Coe, supra note 29, at 60.
62 Id. at 61.
6 Id. at 62; seeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138.
6 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM
& CRLP, supra note 57, at 63; Coe, supra note 29, at 62.
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65
humiliation-all measures that did not include informed consent.
For example, health care providers denied women their fundamental
rights to informed consent when professionals pressured women to
undergo surgical sterilization during "Tubal Ligation Festivals" and at
locations designated for food aid distribution.6 6 Some providers offered women surgical sterilization as the only free method of contraception available. 67 Other health workers did not provide women with
information regarding other available birth control methods and
many times deliberately gave inaccurate information about the risks
and consequences of surgical sterilization procedures. 68 Some women
even reported that professionals in clinics and hospitals intimidated
69
them as they sought medical attention for abortion complications.
The practice of State-sponsored enforced sterilization also caused
numerous deaths due to medical negligence and malpractice. 70 Human rights groups brought one illustrative case, Maria Mamrita Mestanza Chfivez v. Peri, to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights when a thirty-three-year-old, low-income, illiterate woman with
71
seven children died after a coerced surgical sterilization procedure.
Health officials falsely accused Mestanza of violating the law by having
more than five children and threatened to report her to the authorities if she did not submit to surgical sterilization. 72 Health care providers succeeded in coercing Mestanza to undergo a tubal ligation
procedure and failed to examine her prior to the surgery.73 Following
the tubal ligation procedure, the health center released Mestanza

65 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. Coe treads lighdy on blame when talking about the
abuses that occurred. See id. She shows how sterilization was promoted through services
that withheld temporary methods of birth control, such as injections and birth control
pills. Id. She does conclude by saying that "[b]latant deception, economic incentives and
threats were also used," but she does not mention the extent of the abuses. See id.
66 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63-64
(information taken from collective interviews of health care providers).
67 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63-64.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 64.
70 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; Gonzalo E. Gianella, jPor qui Tendria que

HaberSucedido de Otro Modo? Notas Sobre Esterilizacionesy Genocidioen el Peri,Ciberayllu, Aug.
30, 2004, http://www.andes.missouri.edu/andes/Ciberayllu.shtml.
71 Maria Mam6rita Mestanza Chivez v. Peri6, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/l.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003). See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., BRIEFING
PAPER: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROMOTION AND

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2002), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/
pdf/pub bprr interamerican.pdf. (hereinafter CrT. FOR REPROD. Rrs.].
72 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supranote 71, at 15.
73 See id.
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even though they were aware that she suffered from serious complications as a result of the surgery.74 A few days later, Mestanza's partner
attempted to seek emergency medical care from physicians at the
health center, but the physicians refused and reassured him that the
effects of the anesthesia had not yet worn off.75 As a result, Mestanza
76
died in her home nine days after her surgical sterilization.
Coerced and forced sterilization practices contradict Peru's constitutional and legal protections for its citizens. 77 At first, human rights
activists and non-governmental organizations criticized the government's focus on high numeric goals that were bound to lead to
abuses, as the practices were extremely secretive. 78 Later, women's advocacy groups documented the specific instances of abuse and sent
their findings to the Public Ombudsman on Women's Rights. 79 Finally, in December 1997, La Repfiblica, one of Peru's major newspapers, reported an independent investigation and detailed findings on
the population policy implementation that shocked the public. 8°
Once the general public became aware of the extent of Fujimori's demographic policy, a heated debate ensued.8 1 The Ombudsman's office released a report in 1998 of its findings of abuse and recommended reforms in the government's family planning programs.8 2
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. These acts could be considered genocide, as will be
discussed herein. See infta notes 135-171 and accompanying text. The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide to include measures intended to prevent births within the group committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. See Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The difficulty with proving these sterilizations as genocide is proving the specific intent to destroy the Quechua people. See Genocide Convention, supra; see also Part DI(B), infra, for further discussion.
78 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63.
79 See id. Today, groups of victims-survivors exist to provide support and document the
abuses. See Emily Koren, Contra Su Voluntad: The Involuntary Sterilizations of Peru's Family
Planning Program International Human Rights Advocacy Report 8 (May 22, 2008) (unpublished report, The Center for International Human Rights Advocacy at the University
of Denver) (on file with the author). For instance, La Organizaci6n de Mujeres Esterilizadas
Contra Su Voluntad (The Association of Women Sterilized Against Their Will) provides
support to more than 1000 women members in the Cusco region. Id.
80 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63. The title of the article was "Ligations in exchange for
food." Id. at 63 n.38.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id.; DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, SERE INFORMES DEFENSIORALES No. 7, ANTICONCEP-

c16N

QUIRURGICA VOLUNTARIA

I: CASOS INVESTIGADOS POR LA DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO

(1998).
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Other organizations then backed the report and also pressured the
Peruvian government to take action to reform its policies. 83 In March
1998, the Ministry of Health agreed to make changes and reform sterilization services; it eliminated the quotas and implemented new
counseling guidelines, a consent form, a three-day waiting period before the procedure, a day to recover in a hospital after the surgery,
and certification of health care facilities and physicians. 84 Additionally, in 2001, the Peruvian government agreed to settle the case pending in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by compensating Maria Mestanza's family and by taking responsibility for
violating individual human rights, including the rights to life, physical
integrity and humane treatment, equal protection, and the right to be
free from gender-based violence. 85 As part of the settlement, the government promised to investigate other enforced sterilization cases
and to punish those who had violated Peruvian and international
law.86 At the time of this writing, however, the Peruvian government
has not fully complied with its commitments under the Mestanza set87
tlement.
II.

THE PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:
ITS MANDATE AND FINDINGS

Soon after the government reformed its Family Planning Program,
Peru's transition to democracy began in September 2000. 88 This regime
change was not due, however, to public outrage at the atrocities committed during Fujimori's regime, but was largely the result of televised
videos that uncovered a political corruption scandal and implicated
high-level government and military officials, including the head of
Peru's intelligence service, Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN),
Vladimiro Montesinos. 89 Fujimori fled the country in November 2000
and resigned as president via fax from Japan. 90 Thus, unlike the Chil8 Coe, supra note 29, at 63.
84
Id.
85 CT. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 71, at 16.
86

Id.
87 INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUM. Rrs., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2007: STATUS OF
COMPLIANCE wrrH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IACHR (2007), http://www.cidh.org/

annualrep/2007eng/Chap.2.htm.
8 See CONAGHAN, supranote 49, at 227-34.
89 See id. at 228.
90 See Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 29, at 74. In the end, Congress did not accept Fujimori's letter of resignation and declared hin morally unfit to serve as president. CONAGHAN, supra note 49, at 241.
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ean or El Salvadoran transitions, Peru's was a total regime collapse
without a negotiated arrangement, peace accord, or guarantee of impunity.91 The peaceful transition to Valentin Paniagua's interim government and the favorable conditions for democratic transition-the
complete collapse of authoritarian rule and the absence of a powerful
insurgency-provided an opportunity to critically examine the past and
to establish a legitimate democratic regime that would guarantee future
individual and collective human rights-including reproductive
92
rights-in Peru.
In response to public and social group pressure, the newly-formed
government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) 93 in June 2001 to investigate human rights abuses committed during the twenty-year internal conflict. 94 The CVR-composed

of ten men, two women, and one Quechua-speaker 95-was responsible
for determining the conditions that precipitated the violent conflict,
assisting with judicial investigations, drafting reparations proposals, and
recommending reforms.96 Specifically, the CVR mandate charged the
Commission with "clarifying the process, facts and responsibilities of
the terrorist violence and human rights violations produced from May
1980 to November 2000, whether imputable to terrorist organizations
or State agents, as well as proposing initiatives destined to affirm peace
and harmony among Peruvians." 97 This broad and inclusive directive
included interpreting and writing the collective memory of the historical period and fact-finding in individual cases. 98 The mandate also al-

lowed the Commission to determine the appropriateness of identifying
perpetrators who violated criminal law on condition that the responsibilities for such actions would be presumptive and were meant to assist
91 Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 73-74. Fujimori, unlike Pinochet, was an exile

without credibility or impunity. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 332-39.
9 See Supreme Resolution 304-2000-JUS. (2000) (Peru); Gonzilez Cueva, supra note
26, at 74-76.
93Comisi6n de la Verdad y Reconciliaci6ndel Peri.
94See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 260.
9 See Degregori, supra note 20. The one Quechua-speaker was Alberto Morote Sinchez,
a former Rector of the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Comisi6n de la Verdad y
Reconcilaci6n, Nuestra Labor: Comisionado, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/lacomision/
nlabor/comisionado.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); Sabrina Marian Reisinger, Truth, Race
and Reconciliation; Ayacucho and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Nov.
8, 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University), http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/
available/etd-11082005-203231/.
9 HAYNER, supra note 8, at 260-61.
97 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 1, translatedin Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 75.
98See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 2; Gonzfilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 75.
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the Public Prosecutor99 and the courts in their constitutionally granted
duties.100
One example of the expansive nature of the CVR mandate is the

Commission's sweeping subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 1 The list of crimes
included the phrase "and other serious injuries" after the crime of torture, and the phrase "[o] ther crimes and serious violations of the rights
of individuals" to possibly include further abuses of State power, such as
sex crimes, forced internal displacements, due process violations and
genocide. 102 Similarly, the decree authorized the CVR to focus on
"[v]iolations of the collective rights of the country's Andean and native

communities."10 3 Moreover, the mandate broadly defined personal jurisdiction to leave open the possibility to examine acts committed by
State agents, members of "terrorist organizations" and members of paramilitary organizations. 10 4 This grant of jurisdiction was in direct opposition to Fujimori's 1995 amnesty laws and signified a possible end to
the impunity that security forces had enjoyed under Fujimori's re105
gime.

The CVR embarked on the country's largest and most ambitious
human rights project in Peruvian history and clarified the magnitude

99 Ministeyio Pblico.
Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 75, 80; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
101See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3. "The Truth Commission shall focus its
work on...
100

(a) Murders and kidnappings;
(b) Forced disappearances;
(c) Torture and other serious injuries;
(d) Violations of the collective rights of the country's Andean and native communities;
(e) Other crimes and serious violations of the rights of individuals."
Id., translatedin Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 92.
102

Id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76 (noting that the question as to what law to

apply was hotly debated in the Commission's Working Group). The Ministry of Justice
included the application of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. See Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. The representatives of the security
forces rejected the inclusion of the laws of war, as these laws would implicitly give the
twenty-year conflict internal armed conflict status. See id.
103 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3, translatedin GonzAlez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 92.
104 d. arts. 1 & 3; Gonzalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. Later talks would apply the "paramilitary groups" category to the several death squads that emerged during the two decades of conflict either indirectly or directly under the auspices of the Armed Forces. See
Gonzalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76.
105See Law 26479 of June 14, 1995 (Peru); Law 26492 of June 28, 1995 (Peru); Gonzalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72-73; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
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of the atrocities committed by and against fellow Peruvians. 10 6 The
Commission's findings in its August 2003 Final Report included statistics showing that almost 70,000 people were killed or "disappeared,"
and of those, more than ninety percent came from the eight poorest
Andean and Amazonian regions. 0 7 In addition, more than seventy percent of victims spoke Quechua as their native language. 08 Thus, the
findings demonstrated that victims of the armed conflict were overwhelmingly low-income, rural, indigenous peasants with little or no political or economic power in Peruvian society.' 9
As for those responsible for the conflict and its outcomes, the CVR
promoted a comprehensive and inclusive notion of accountability." 0 The
Final Report found State limitations in protecting fundamental rights of
its citizens and securing the public order, as well as breaches of the constitutional order and rule of law in numerous moments of crisis
throughout the internal conflict."' Although the two terrorists groups-the Shining Path and the Tfipac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA)--carried the bulk of the responsibility for systematic abuses
and violence during the armed conflict, the Report also held state, political, and social entities responsible for many of the gross human rights
112

violations.

III. TRUTH OMISSIONS FROM THE CVR's FINAL REPORT
A. Broad Mandate, Restricted Inteipretation
Even with the CVR's comprehensive and inclusive notions of accountability, various organizations criticized and questioned the Commission's decision to exclude cases of violations with ambiguous or tan106See Degregori, supra note 20. The CVR collected nearly 17,000 testimonies from
across the country, conducted almost 2000 interviews and talked to the main national political and military leaders during the years 1980-2000. Id.
107See Degregori, supra note 20.
108
Id. The Final Report also gives the astonishing statistic that according to the 1993 census, only sixteen percent of the Peruvian population were native Quechua-speakers. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 9, at 1(6). Also, the people from these regions together represent only
nine percent of the income of all Peruvian families. Amnesty Int'l, supranote 8, at 15.
109
See FINAL REPORT, supranote 9, at 1(6); Degregori, supra note 20.
110See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, passim (holding accountable the Shining Path, the
MRTA, Peruvian police and Armed Forces, self-defense committees, the various government parties in power during the conflict, the Peruvian legislature and judiciary, trade
organizations, the educational system, the Church, human rights organizations, and the
media).
M See id. at 1(10)-(l11).
112 See id. at 11-V.
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gential relations to the armed conflict in the Final Report."13 Without a
general policy to guide decision-making among the Commission's regional offices, Commissioners drew different lines as to which cases to
investigate and publish under the mandate. 114 As a result, cases such as
those of the enforced sterilizations during the Fujimori regime were
not considered in the context of insurgency or counter-insurgency and
thus were seen by some of the Commissioners as outside of the Commission's mandate and not included in the CVR's Final Report.115
Because the Executive gave the CVR a sufficiently broad mandate
to include State-sponsored enforced sterilizations, the Commission's
omission was a self-imposed, interpretive-albeit inattentive- restriction on the Commission's investigation and Final Report." 6 Of course,
truth commissioners must make certain choices as to which cases
commissions investigate and report as a result of time constraints, resource limits, insufficient information, unreliable evidence, repetition
117
of wrongs already documented elsewhere, and political pressures.
Reports should not, however, exclude cases of gross human rights violations if the effects are to perpetuate discrimination, racism, and classism as well as to impede justice, including reproductive justice, for victims." 8 Rather, commissioners should make a careful and conscientious

effort to investigate and report abuses committed against the most disenfranchised members of society, especially when their mandate so requires, but even when it is ambiguous. 119 In the case of the CVR its

113 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20; interview with Carlos Ivin Degregori, former Commissioner of the Peruvian Truth Commission, in Ithaca, N.Y (Nov. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Degregori Interview].
114 See id.
115 See Gianella, supra note 70, at 3; Guilia Tamayo, Metas que Matan, http://w3.
desco.org.pe/publicaciones/QH/QH/qhll lgt.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). During separate interviews, two of the Peruvian Truth Commission's Commissioners, Salom6n Lerner
Febres and Carlos Ivin Degregori, stated that they did not think that these enforced sterilization cases were within the Truth Commission's mandate. However, after looking at the text of
the mandate once more, each one remarked that these cases could have been included in
the mandate and that they were overlooked due to a lack of time and resources. Degregori
Interview, supra note 113; Interview with Salom6n Lerner Febres, former President of the
Peruvian Truth Commission, in Lima, Pert (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Lerner Febres Interview].
116 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM; Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner
Febres Interview, supra note 115.
117 See HAYNER, supranote 8, at 73.
118 See id. at 24-31, 73; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 1-2, 19-20.
119 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM, passim; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20.
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mandate's broad language required an investigation of enforced sterilizations.120 Priscilla Hayner argues that:
[T] he practice of rape and other sexual crimes should be fully
acknowledged in a commission's report where it is believed
such a practice was widespread. If a truth commission does
not take special care in addressing this issue, it is likely that it
will remain largely shrouded in silence and hidden from the
history books-and also likely that few policy, educational, or
reparatory measures will be put in place to assist past victims,
increase the public understanding of the issue, or reduce the
121
prevalence of sexual abuse in the future.
In the cases of enforced sterilizations, the CVR did not make such a
conscientious, inclusive effort. 122 As a result, impoverished, indigenous
Quechua-speaking women continued to face multiple layers of discrimination-including social, racial, and gender discrimination-first
as victims and later as unrecognized victims of State repression and de123
nial of basic human rights during the twenty-year internal conflict.
Thus, the omission of enforced sterilization cases excluded women who
were already members of socially and politically marginalized groups
and greatly decreased their chances for truth, accountability, and jus124
tice in Peruvian society.
The CVR Commissioners could give reasons for excluding enforced
sterilization cases from their investigation and report, such as the mandate's restriction or the repetition of other investigations or reports, but
none should outweigh the reasons to include such widespread, Statesponsored violations of reproductive rights as part of Peru's official collective memory.125 First, Commissioners did not see enforced sterilizations as an included crime in the Truth Commission's mandate. 126 In
contrast to the CVs inclusive mandate, the mandate of the South Afri120

See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM, passim.

121 HAYNER,

supra note 8, at 78-79.

See id.; FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, passim.
123 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20.
124 See id. at 1-2, 19-20; HAYNER, supra note 8, at 24-31; MINOW, supranote 4, at 24-27.
125 See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner Febres Interview, supra note 115. In
122

speaking with CVR Commissioners, they defended their non-inclusion of the enforced
sterilizations cases by pointing to the separate investigations and reports written on the
subject. See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner Febres Interview, supra note 115.
This, however, is not a valid reason for exclusion because all cases of violence reported by
the Commission required an independent and effective investigation as well. See Supreme
Decree 065-2001-PCM arts. 1-3.
126 See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
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can Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not cover all of
the abusive practices of apartheid, especially with regards to detention
without trial, racial segregation, and the practice of "forced removals" of
blacks to barren lands. 12 7 Failing to include these and other apartheid
practices in the final report, even where justified because the practices
were already well-documented, "prevented many South Africans from
seeing their own personal experience reflected in the commission's
work." 28 Despite its restrictive mandate, the South African TRC held
institutional hearings and found fault with some social and institutional
structures of the apartheid system.'2 This limited investigation, however, did not counter the South African TRC's inclusion of mostly extreme violence to the exclusion of a comprehensive investigation and
report on the widespread State-sponsored systematic abuses committed
against many Africans. 30° This exclusion, as a result, hindered the TRC's
3
goal to ensure social justice for the African majority.
Unlike the South African TRC, however, the Peruvian CVR's executive mandate did not limit the scope of investigations or reports to
exclude enforced sterilizations. 3 2 In fact, it specifically endorsed a
broad mandate which could have included systemic abuses such as coerced surgical sterilizations. 3 3 Although the CVR's Final Report did
recognize the rights of women and the gross violations of human
rights-including finding rape to be an instrument of torture-committed against women largely by the Peruvian Armed Forces, it still fell
short by excluding gross, systematic human rights abuses of enforced
sterilizations against mainly low-income, indigenous Quechua
women. 3 4 Because the decree did not make distinctions between those
human rights violations directly related to insurgency or counterinsurgency measures and those violations tangentially related, the
Commissioners should not have made such distinctions that have led to
the exclusion of more than 200,000 cases of enforced sterilizations
from the Commission's Final Report. 135 In doing so, the Commission
allowed Lima, the capital city and center of political discourse and pub127

See HAYNER, supranote 8, at 73; WILSON, supra note 8, at 34.

28

1 HAYNER, supranote 8, at 73.
129 See WILSON, supra note 8, at 35-36.

130 See id. at 35.
1s1See id.
132Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3.
lS3 Id.
134 SeeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 18, 19-20, FINAL REPORT, supm note 9, at Il(A) (46).
135 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM arts. 1 & 3; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 1920; Gonzilez Cueva, supranote 26, at 78.
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lic opinion, to remain "emotionally distant" from these victims of Statesupported violence and helped to further alienate many victims from
the CVR's work.1 36 In this regard, the CVR helps to perpetuate and legitimize physical, racial, and class divides in Peruvian society and impedes public support for accountability and reproductive justice
137
through the rule of law.
Additionally, the CVR Commissioners' reasoning did not apply in
all cases since they were inconsistent when they investigated and published other crimes Fujimori committed-largely in the context of
political corruption and authoritarian rule-during his regime that
may not directly relate to the insurgency or counter-insurgency 1 38 Because incontrovertible evidence that demonstrated high levels of state
and political corruption naturally affected Peruvians with economic
and political power, public outrage and media coverage demanded
that the CVR investigate and record those atrocities. 139 Therefore,
those abuses of power became part of the historical record, and efforts today continue to push for accountability and criminal responsibility for the corruption crimes that Fujimori committed against Peruvians. 14 In the end, this inconsistency and selective treatment of
cases demonstrates that, at least for the excluded victims of enforced
sterilization, the truth-seeking process cannot be seen as "more than
the reconfiguration of government pacts or domination between elites." 141 As a result, in this version of reconciliation, the same speakers
1 42
are speaking and the same voiceless victims are silenced.
B. Enforced Sterilizations of Quechua Women as Genocide
1. The Elements of Genocide
When a Congressional subcommittee investigated cases of enforced sterilizations and issued its report, it accused the Fujimori regime of committing genocide against the Quechua people through the

1s6Degregori, supra note 20.

137See id.
138 See FINAL REPORT, supranote 9, at IH(D); Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 78.
139 See CONAGHAN, supra note 49, at 229; KIMBERLY THEIDON, ENTRE PR6JIMos: EL CONFLICTO ARMADO INTERNO Y LA POLITICA DE LA RECONCILIACI6N EN EL PERO

256 (2004).

See Raul Rosasco, YDespuds de laCVR Qui?: Informe Seminal Sobre las Reacciones al Informe Finalde laCVR y los Avances Respecto a sus Recomendaciones, Nov. 14-20, 2005, at 3.
141THEIDON, supranote 139, at 256 (author's translation).
142 Id.
140
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Family Planning Program. 143 There are arguments for and against classifying these cases of enforced sterilizations as acts of genocide, and
these arguments will be discussed below. 144 Ultimately, however, the victims of these human rights abuses need an impartial, independent investigation to take these issues out of the political realm and into the
discourse of individual and collective reparations as well as reproduc45
tive justice.
First, the term "genocide" combines the Greek word genos (race or
tribe) with the Latin suffix -ide (killing), and is the intentional killing,
destruction or extermination of groups or members of a group. 146 The
crime of genocide is recognized as part of customary international law
147
and a part of jus cogens, the body of peremptory international norms.
In addition, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as follows:
[A] ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. 14

3

14 AQV, supranote 56, at 108.
144 See infra notes 135-171 and accompanying text.
145 See infra Part I(D).
146 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 127 (2d. ed. 2008); KRiANGSAK
KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 67-68 (2001).
147 KITrICHAISAREE,

supra note 146, at 67. Under customary international law, the

United Nations summit in September 2005 adopted the Outcome Document, which affirms that every state is responsible for protecting its citizens from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry'sFindings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv.

1703, 1703 (2006).
148 Genocide Convention, supra note 77. The Convention does prohibit genocide in
times of war, in times of peace and holds perpetrators (and other participants) of genocide
criminally responsible, while holding the state responsible as well. See id.
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The definition deliberately omits acts of cultural and political genocide,
and the Convention provides an ineffective enforcement through domestic trials in the state where the genocide occurred.1 49 Much progress, however, has occurred at the international level to prosecute and
punish perpetrators of genocide. For example, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) provide for criminal action against perpetrators of genocide. 150 The ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have tried individuals charged with genocide and have delivered landmark decisions that shape the evolving
standards and norms for this crime against humanity. 151
In order to prove genocide, victims must fall under one or more of
the definition's enumerated groups.15 2 To determine whether an enumerated group exists in a particular case, a court may analyze subjective
criteria, objective criteria, or both. 153 In a subjective analysis, the court
"tak[es] into account the relevant evidence and the political and cultural context of the society concerned" on a case-by-case basis.1 54 For
instance, in the case of Rwanda, the court examined the perceptions of
Hutu and Tutsi members as well as Rwandan authorities adopted from
colonial rule that Hutus and Tutsis belonged to two distinct ethnic
groups. 155 Alternatively, the court may use objective facts that indicate a
population is a group with a distinct identity, such as state recognition
or customary practices.' 5 6 In the case of Rwanda, the government re-

quired every citizen to carry identity cards displaying their ethnic identity as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and the country's legislation at the time re57
ferred to citizens by their respective ethnic groups.
149 See CASSESE, supra note 146, at 130-32. Cultural Genocide is destroying a group's
language or culture. Id. at 130. Political Genocide is exterminating a group based on political grounds. Id.
150 Id. at 132.
151Id. See generally Prosecutor v. Jelisid, Case No. IT 95-10, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999),
affid, Case No. IT 95-10-A (July 5, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-TJudgment (Sept. 2, 1998).

152

See KrrICHAISAREE, supranote 146, at 69.

153Id. at 70-71.
154 Id. at 71 (citing Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3,Judgment,

55 (Dec.

6, 1999)).
155Id.
156 See id. There were objective indicators in the Rutaganda case, such as identity cards
carried by the Tutsi population as well as the fact that customary determination of group
membership was patrilineal. Id.
157KrrlICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 71.
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In addition, a perpetrator commits genocide through the defimition's enumerated discriminatory acts or omissions with the necessary
mens rea.158 These acts or omissions, however, do not necessarily involve the actual extinction or annihilation of the group, and motive is
not an element of the crime of genocide. 59 Thus, the individual accused of genocide must have either known or should have known that
"his act [or omission] would destroy, in whole or in part [the] protected group." 60 In contrast to the crime against humanity of persecution, which requires a discriminatory intent, genocide requires that
the prosecution prove the accused possessed the specific intent to de161
stroy a particular group beyond a reasonable doubt.
In order to prove genocidal intent, the prosecution must show that
the accused wanted either to destroy a large number of group members
or to exterminate a limited number of group members selected be62
cause their annihilation would greatly impact the group's survival.
Thus, killing or sterilizing a large number of women group members
who are of child bearing age can be considered genocide even though
63
they do not comprise a large percentage of the group's population.
Also, the accused must form his specific intent to commit genocide be64
fore acting in furtherance of the genocidal intent.
Although the crimes committed must demonstrate genocidal intent, the prosecution can prove the element of intent by inferring from
"facts such as words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful action that deliberately, consistently, and systematically targets victims on account of
their membership of a particular group while excluding the members
of other groups." 165 Evidence to construct genocidal intent may include
the general context of other acts committed against the same group,
the physical targeting of the group, the extent of bodily injury, the methodical nature of planning, and the scale of actual or attempted de158 Id. (citing Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1 497; Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10, 1 62).
Thus, failing to stop a massacre when the individual had the means and notice to stop it
could be regarded as genocide. See id.
159 Id. at 71, 76; see STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HuMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 29
(2d ed. 2001).
160 KrITICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 72 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,

1520).
161

Id.

162 Id. at
163

73.
See id.

16 Id. (citing Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case
165 KITrlCHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 74.

No. ICTR 95-1-T,

91).
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struction of the group. 166 In the end, even though it is difficult to prove
genocidal intent in the case of an individual backed by the State, proving the required specific intent for genocide is somewhat easier than
167
originally anticipated through the use of circumstantial evidence.
2. Applying the Elements of Genocide Under the Convention to the
Case of Enforced Sterilizations in Peru
A strong case can be made that the enforced sterilizations of more
than 200,000 low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women were
acts of genocide. 168 First, the indigenous Quechua-speaking women are
members of two protected groups enumerated in the defmition of
genocide since the Quechua people are a distinct racial and ethnic
group in Peru. 169 The indigenous Quechua people objectively belong
to a racial group since they share common, constant, and hereditary
features, and are an ethnic group since they are "a community of persons linked by the same customs, the same language and the same
race." 170 Additionally, from a subjective analysis, the racial and ethnic
divides among criollos, mestizos, cholos, and indigenas in Peruvian society
also contribute to the notion that the Quechua people are a distinct
cultural group. 171 Although the overt motive behind Fujimori's Family
Planning Program was to curb population growth and to alleviate poverty on a massive scale, it is clear that because motive is not an element
of genocide, indigenous Quechua women would not lose their protected group status. 172 In other words, their protected status as members of a racial or ethnic group would override their status as a member
of a particular social demographic. 73 Therefore, the motive of population control would not negate an intention to prevent births within the
16 6

Id.
167 See id. at 74-75.
168 See Genocide Convention, supranote 77, art. I; RATNER & ABRAMS, supranote 159,

at 33-35.
169 See Genocide Convention, supranote 77, art. II.
170 See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 33 (quoting STIFAN GLASER, DROrr INTERNATIONAL PNAL CONVENTIONNEL 111-12 (1970), translated and quoted in Study of the

Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, prepared by
Nicodhme Ruhashyamiko,July 4, 1978, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, at 15-16).
171 See Degregori, supra note 20.
172 See Coe, supra note 29, at 56, 61; cf RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 35. These

authors speak of "political groups" and do not speak specifically of poverty as a group.
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 35. The same could be said for poverty as a status
incidental to (and not overriding) a group's protected status. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra
note 159, at 35.
173 See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 33-35.
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group. 174 As a result, one could prove that Fujimori's Family Planning
Program intended to prevent births among the Quechua people, de1 75
spite his alleged motives.
Next, those individuals responsible for orchestrating enforced sterilizations against indigenous Quechua women arguably acted with the
necessary mens rea to commit genocide since they knew or should have
known that these coercive sterilizations would destroy, in whole or in
part, the Quechua people. 76 Highly probative evidence with which one
could infer genocidal intent would include the Family Planning Program's specific targeting of poor indigenous women and the systematic
nature of its quota system, articulated in the 1989 Plan for a Government of National Reconstruction, or "Plan Verde." 177 Specifically, the
Plan stated that it was necessary to quickly curb population growth and
mandate treatment for the "surplus beings [through a] generalized
sterilization use among those culturally backward and impoverished
groups." i7 8 The Plan continued by arguing that because those individuals from the targeted areas possessed "incorrigible characters" and
lacked resources, all that was left was their "total extermination." 79
Seeking out particular groups to sterilize in violation of reproductive
rights and imposing upon health care providers an obligatory quota
system which caused coercive practices demonstrate a destructive pattern on the part of government officials to prevent births within the

174See
175See

id.
id.

176 KITrCHAISAREE,

supra note 146, at 72 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,

520).
177 See Historia de una Traici6n: Muchos Misterios Quedardn Revalados al Conocerse el Plan
Militarque Se Consolid6 el 5-IV-92, at 9 (1993), http://www.resistencia.org/documentos/el_
plan-verde/historia de unajtraicion.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008); Amnesty Int'l, supra
note 8, at 20.
178 Historia de una Traici6n, supra note 177, at 9 (author's translation). The Plan reads
in Spanish:

Ha quedado demonstrado la necesidad de frenar lo mis pronto posible el
crecimiento demogrfifico y urge, adicionalmente, un tratamiento para los excedentes existentes: utilizaci6n generalizada de esterilizaci6n en los grupos
culturalmente atrasados y econ6micamente pauperizados .... Los mkodos
compulsivos deben tener solo ciracter experimental, pero deben ser norma
en todos los centros de salfid la ligadura de trompas .... Hay que discriminar
el excedente poblacional y los sectores nocivos de la poblaci6n. Para estos
sectores, dado su ciracter de incorrigibles y la carencia de recursos ... solo
queda su exterminio total.
Id.
179

Id. (author's translation).
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indigenous Quechua-speaking population. 8° Moreover, under Fujimori's population control program, there existed a clear pattern of victims-namely poor, indigenous Quechua-speaking women-a high
level of planning at the state level through the formal Family Planning
Program, and a large number of victims considering that in 1993 only a
1 81
fifth of Peru's population spoke Quechua or other native languages.
On the other hand, there are legal and practical concerns with
classifying the enforced sterilization of Quechua women as an act of
genocide. 182 For example, one could argue that the State did not administer population control and family planning programs to Quechua
women to the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups from enforced sterilization procedures. 183 This argument is weak, however, because perpetrators of genocide can theoretically have the specific intent
to destroy more than one protected group under the auspices of a single State-sponsored plan to eradicate poverty and curb population
growth through sterilization procedures. 184 Also, as a practical matter,
conservative groups in Peru and abroad who oppose contraception and
reproductive choice for women have capitalized on the classification of
the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program as an act of genocide.18 5
As a result, international human rights advocates who promote accountability and justice for crimes against humanity and genocide must
make strategic choices since their decisions and actions could negatively affect future reproductive rights, choice, and health among
Quechua women who have already been victims of State-enforced sterilization campaigns. 1 6
C. Enforced Sterilizations as Violations of Individual Human Rights
Aside from the viable claim that the systematic enforced sterilizations against Quechua women constituted an act of genocide, these actions also implicate numerous violations of other human rights, includSee id.; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20.
Int'l, supranote 8, at 15.
182 See id., at 20; seeAQV, supra note 56, at 108.
18 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20. Indigenous Amazonian women were also
among those who reported enforced sterilization procedures. Id.
184 See KrICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 72-75.
18 See AQV, supra note 56, at 108; CAceres et al., supra note 52, at 143. Within a year of
Toledo's election into presidency, a conservative Catholic Opus Dei physician was appointed as Health Minister of Peru, and later went on to become the country's Prime Minister. ARAMBURU, supra note 52, at 11.
186 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; AQV, supra note 56, at 108; Cficeres et al., supra note 52, at 143.
180

181Amnesty
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ing reproductive rights, under national, regional, and international
law.' 8 7 Legal instruments that obligate Peru to protect women against
enforced sterilization include, but are not limited to, the Peruvian Constitution, 188 the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), 189 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 190 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 19' and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 92 The protective
provisions enumerated within these instruments include those that protect the right to personal autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, and
autonomous decision-making in women's reproductive lives. 193
For instance, the Peruvian Constitution guarantees all Peruvians
the right to dignity; life; moral, psychological, and physical integrity;
liberty and security of the person; and to be free from all forms of violence and from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 194 Thus,
the State has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights
through national laws and legal mechanisms to investigate and punish
violations. In the case of enforced sterilizations, the Peruvian government has enacted laws to protect women; however, these laws are
not enforced and violators continue to enjoy impunity from punish-

187 See, e.g., infra notes 188-192.
188 CONSTrrucI6N POLiTICA DEL PER6 [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU] [hereinafter PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION].
189Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,

1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. In addition, the Convention of Belem do Patti protects women against all forms of violence, including violence within the health care system. See Inter-American Convention on the Pre-

vention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1534 [hereinafter Convention Belem do Pard].

190 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
191International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
192Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women recognizes "that some groups of women, such as women belonging
to minority groups, indigenous women, refugee women, migrant women, women living in rural

or remote communities, destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female
children, women with disabilities, elderly women, and women in situations of armed conflict,
are especially vulnerable to violence." Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,1 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994) (emphasis added).
193 See supra notes 172-176.
194 SeePERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 188, at ch.1, arts. 1, 2-1, 2-24(a), 2-24(h).
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ment. 195 Even though abuses such as enforced sterilizations have been
documented, public authorities have dismissed the violations as isolated incidents, and health care professionals paternalistically defend
their actions as beneficial to their patients and "intended to avoid
greater injury to the patient."196 In light of these protections, women
victims of enforced sterilizations have viable claims at the national
197
level to remedy the wrongs committed against them.
Many of these national protections, however, are unenforceable or
inaccessible to the low-income women-victims of the Voluntary Surgical
Contraception program. 198 Thus, complaints to regional or international human rights bodies are also valid and actionable claims. 199 The
American Convention, for example, protects individuals' rights to life;
personal integrity; health; to provide free and informed consent; privacy; equality; and non-discrimination. 200 Public health care providers

violated these rights when they performed unnecessary surgery on
women-victims without obtaining informed consent, as well as when, in
certain circumstances, they failed to perform preliminary examinations
or to give post-operative care, which ultimately led to death and disabil20 1

ity for women-victims.

Under the ICCPR, Peru has committed itself to respect, protect
and fulfill its citizens' civil and political rights, including the rights to
life, non-discrimination, gender equality, liberty, personal security,
195 See, e.g., General Law on Health arts. 4, 6, 15, 26, 27 & 40 (promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 26842, July 15, 1997) (protecting rights to life and health); PERUVIAN PENAL CODE art. 376 (promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 635, Apr. 3, 1991) (abuse of
authority). There is no crime of infliction of suffering on patients by health care providers.
See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 42-43.
196 CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 43.
197 See generally PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 188; General Law on Health, supra
note 195; PERUVIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 195.
198 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 41-48. See generally CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs.
& DEMUS: EsTUDIO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER, WOMEN OF THE
WORLD: LAWS AND POLITICS THAT AFFECT THEIR REPRODUCTIVE LIVES, LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 170-92 (1997); CmR. FOR REPROD. RTs. & DEMUS: ESTUDIO PARA LA
DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: LATIN AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN PROGRESS REPORT 2000, at 83-102 (2001) (reporting on the laws regarding
reproductive health and lives of women in Peru).
199 See American Convention, supra note 189, arts. 4, 5, 7, 11 & 24. In order for a complaint to be admissible, the applicant must prove that she has exhausted all local remedies
or that special circumstances exist that make exhaustion of local remedies impossible. For
a more complete explanation, see Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee,
5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N.C. 341, 364-81 (2001); Velfisquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct.

H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4. (July 29, 1988).
200 See American Convention, supra note 189, arts. 4, 5, 7, 11 & 24.
201 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs., supra note 71, at 12-16.
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and privacy, along with freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. 20 2 Additionally, the ICESCR protects the rights
to non-discrimination, equality, and health. 20 3 Similarly, under the
CEDAW, Peru guarantees rights to women that protect against enforced sterilization under Articles 5, 12, and 16, which are further articulated in General Recommendations 19, 21, and 24.204 For example, in General Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee asks
States to take measures to "prevent coercion in regard to fertility and
reproduction." 205 All of these State duties at international law give individual women-victims of enforced sterilizations the ability to hold
the Peruvian government responsible for the human rights violations
committed against them.
The Peruvian government officially acknowledged State responsibility for violations of international law under the American Convention
when it settled the case of Maria MamritaMestanza Chdvez v. Peri.2 6 Specifically, the settlement agreement recognized State violations of the victim's rights to life, physical integrity, humane treatment, equal protection of the law, and freedom from gender-based violence.20 7 Although
settlement agreements with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights are not binding jurisprudence at international law, these recognitions of State responsibility are highly persuasive admissions to use in
any further legal action at the regional or international levels.208 More-

over, the Peruvian government undertook to investigate and punish
those responsible for the violations as well as to reform legislation and
create procedures to handle patient complaints within the health care
system. 2 09 As a result, ongoing rights violations are occurring as long as

ICCPR, supra note 190, arts. 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 & 17.
See ICESCR, supra note 191, arts. 2, 3 & 12.
204 See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Report of

202 See
203

the Comm. on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women, General Recommendation No. 24,
22, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1999); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women [CEDAW], Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 21, 22, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Jan. 1, 1994); Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, 1 22, U.N. Doc.
A/47/38 (Feb. 19, 1993) [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation 19].
205 CEDAW General Recommendation 19, supra note 204.
206 See Maria Mamhrita Mestanza Chivez v. Per6, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/Ill18, doc. 70 rev. 2 1 1, 14 (2003).
207 See id.; CR. FOR REPROD. Rrs., supra note 71, at 16.
208 See American Convention, supra note 189, at art. 48.
209 See CR. FOR REPROD. RTs., supra note 71, at 16-17.
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Peru fails to implement these changes and denies women-victims their
210
rights at national, regional, and international law.

D. The Need for an Independent and ImpartialInvestigation
The CVR Commissioners recognized that other bodies within
Peru's government and civil society either had conducted or were in
the process of conducting their own investigations and reports on the
cases of enforced sterilizations. 211 Although a Congressional subcommittee and numerous activist groups investigated and published testimonies and cases condemning the State's Family Planning Program
and its health care providers, members of each of these bodies had a
specific political or social interest in advocating certain positions and
conclusions. 2 12 In contrast, the CVR was in a unique and disinterested
position to evaluate, as it could have based "conclusions and recommendations on a close study of the record, while standing as an independent institution separate from the systems under review."213 Opinion polls in Lima confirmed the public confidence in the
performance of the CVR and the positive impact the public saw the
Final Report have on Peru. 214 In addition, most individuals opined
that the government should implement the CVR's recommendations
for reparations, reform, and justice. 215 The CVR's widespread public
support and overall legitimacy helped create some institutional momentum to keep the possibility of criminal justice and accountability
open for the future, but only for those cases investigated and reported.2 1 6 Thus, the exclusion of State-sponsored enforced sterilizations in the Final Report effectively impeded future criminal judicial
2 17
action for thousands of marginalized Quechua women in Peru.
The conservative Congressional Committee members who submitted the final report on conclusions and recommendations in cases of
State-led enforced sterilization campaigns have politicized these human
rights abuses and have used human rights language to strategically restrict reproductive choice for Peruvian women through repeals of laws
that make surgical sterilization a legal option for reproductive choice in
210 See id.
211

212

213

Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 83-89.
See CLADEM & CRLP, supranote 57, at 7.
See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 29.

SeeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 27.
215 See id.
214

216 See id.
217 See id.
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Peru. 218 As mentioned above, these conservatives are utilizing their in-

vestigation and report on human rights abuses to recommend committing further human rights abuses against women. 219 During the Toledo
220
regime, reproductive rights and health advances had nearly halted.
For example, new policy initiatives stress abstinence-only methods for
sexually transmissible infection (STI) prevention and natural methods
for family planning.2 21 In addition, government agencies have stopped
promoting gender equality and sexual education, and health officials
have prevented access to services and information on modern methods
of contraception. 222 These programs and future strategies have further
subordinated women in Peruvian society and have increased reliance on
223
natural reproductive methods and unsafe abortions.
Including the cases of enforced sterilizations in the CVR Final Report or even creating a separate impartial truth commission investigating and reporting these State-sponsored abuses could have served to
prevent claims of genocide from instilling fear and causing a conservative backlash in reproductive rights issues. 224 In addition, including

these cases in the Commission's report could have created a legitimate
independent declaration of human rights abuses as acts of genocide
and as individual violations of reproductive choice and health. 225
Moreover, including these cases could have kept these human rights
atrocities out of the political arena and in the hands of the victims who
deserve retribution, reparations, and reconciliation.2 26 Although including these abuses would not have guaranteed a tangible victory for
the victims or their families, it would have constituted a moral, symbolic
victory for low-income, rural Quechua women and a step forward in an
uphill battle for recognition as Peruvian citizens. 2 27 Though the Peru218

See AQV, supra note 56, passim; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7; Coe, supra

note 29, at 65.
219 See AQV, supra note 56, passim; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7; Coe, supra
note 29, at 65.
220 See Coe, supra note 29, at 65.
221Id.
222 Id.

For example, HIV prevention was part of a "Risk Reduction" program that also

included malaria, dengue and other infectious diseases. Id.
223 Id. Coe argues that U.S. policy shifts toward the far right have also threatened reproductive rights in Peru. Id.
224 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 144-48; see also, supra, notes 211-223 and accompanying text.
225 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 27; HAYNER, supranote 8, at 29. These are the two
main arguments put forth by investigations and advocates. See, e.g., Chceres et al., supra
note 52, at 147-48, 162-63.
226 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7.
227 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20; supra notes 8 and 12.
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vian government has issued a public apology for its mass sterilization
campaign, excluding these cases from any commission of inquiry
greatly reduces the possibility of individual accountability for the perpe228
trators and justice for the victims of enforced sterilizations in Peru.

CONCLUSION

A distinctive feature of truth commissions is their focus on victims,
reconciliation, and healing as well as their reporting to create a framework to ensure transitional justice as a mechanism to deal with a nation's past human rights abuses. 229 One problem, however, is that truth-

telling can never be comprehensive enough to encompass all of the
competing perceptions of past events.

230

In addition, healing and jus-

tice-especially in the field of reproductive rights and justice-seem
incompatible and unworkable where victims have no political power or
economic means to reconcile and rebuild their communities. 231 Complex analyses by truth commissions, however, can produce a record and
collective memory to prevent future human rights violations, and the
exclusion of certain abuses creates a void in the attempt at finding
2 32
truth, reconciliation, and justice for transitional states.
For more than 200,000 indigenous Quechua-speaking women in
Peru, time has not healed their wounds of the past. These individuals
deserve a legitimate, independent, and thorough investigation of the
human rights abuses committed against them. Even if a lack of resources impedes the possibility for adequate monetary reparations or
legal action for reproductive justice, a good faith inquiry to uncover the
truth and an acknowledgement of past wrongs would constitute an important symbolic victory for indigenous rights, reproductive rights, and
human rights for the indigenous Quechua peoples of Peru. Restoring
dignity and recognizing individual rights of Quechua women could
succeed as a step toward bridging the economic, racial, and ethnic divides that continue to perpetuate inequality, discrimination, and hatred
among Peruvians.
228

See AQV, supra note 56, at 108; Coe, supra note 29, at 65; supranotes 8 and 12. For a

discussion on the issues and problems surrounding reparations and public apologies, see
generally MiIow, supra note 4.
229 See MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 60-61 (1998).
230 See id. at 62.
231

See id. at 63.

232

See id. at 78-79; Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Rec-
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Official acknowledgment of the truth is extremely powerful in the
healing process, especially in an atmosphere previously dominated by
official denial.2 33 If this is the case, then no official acknowledgment of
truth after official denial can be equally powerful in impeding reconciliation and healing. When truth commissions deprive certain individuals or groups of the opportunity to have their stories entered into
the historical record, they effectively-even if inadvertently--deny victims access to the public and political discourse and leave victims disempowered in their struggle for justice and accountability. Future truth
commissions, thus, should ensure that the marginalized victims in society do not remain silenced and alienated in the creation of the historical record and collective memory. When forgotten, history does have a
tendency to repeat itself.
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See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 27.
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